Language Games by Asher, Nicholas & Paul, Soumya
Any correspondence concerning this service should be sent 
to the repository administrator: tech-oatao@listes-diff.inp-toulouse.fr 
This is an author’s version published in: 
http://oatao.univ-toulouse.fr/22181 
Official URL 
DOI : https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-53826-5_1 
Open  Archive  Toulouse  Archive  Ouverte 
OATAO is an open access repository that collects the work of Toulouse 
researchers and makes it freely available over the web where possible 
To cite this version: Asher, Nicholas and Paul, Soumya Language 
Games. (2016) In: 9th International Conference Logical Aspects of 
Computational Linguistics (LACL 2016), 5 December 2016 - 7 December 
2016 (Nancy, France). 
Language Games
Nicholas Asher and Soumya Paul(B)
Institut de Recherche en Informatique de Toulouse, Toulouse, France 
nicholas.asher@irit.fr, soumya.paul@gmail.com
Abstract. In this paper we summarize concepts from earlier work and demonstrate 
how infinite sequential games can be used to model strategic conversations. Such a 
model allows one to reason about the structure and complexity of various kinds of 
winning goals that conversationalists might have. We show how to use tools from 
topology, set-theory and logic to express such goals. Our contribution in this paper 
is to offer a detailed examination of an example in which a player ‘defeats himself’ 
by going inconsistent, and to introduce a simple yet revealing way of talking about 
unawareness. We then demonstrate how we can use ideas from epistemic game 
theory to define various solution concepts and justify rationality assumptions 
underlying a conversation.
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1 Introduction
A strategic conversation involves (at least) two people (agents) who have oppos-
ing interests concerning the outcome of the conversation. A debate between
two political candidates is an instance. Each candidate has a certain number of
points she wants to convey to the audience, and each wants to promote her own
position and damage that of her opponent or opponents. In other words, each
candidate wants to win. To achieve these goals each participant needs to plan for
anticipated responses from the other. Debates are thus a sequence of exchange of
messages at the end of which an agent may win, lose or draw. Similar strategic
reasoning about what one says is a staple of board room or faculty meetings,
bargaining sessions, etc.
It is therefore natural to model such conversations as games. Attempts to this
end have been made in the past with the most notable of them being the use of
signaling games [24] and the closely related persuasion games [15]. In a signaling
game one player with a knowledge of the actual state sends a signal and the
other player who has no knowledge of the state chooses an action, usually upon
an interpretation of the received signal. The standard setup supposes that both
players have common knowledge of each other’s preference profiles as well as their
own over a set of commonly known set of possible states, actions and signals.
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However for modeling non-cooperative strategic contexts of sequential dynamic
games, signaling games suffer from many drawbacks. Some of them can be sum-
marised as follows (see [4] for a more comprehensive discussion):
– A game that models a non-cooperative setting, that is a setting where the
preferences of the players are opposed, must be zero-sum. However, it has been
shown [11] that under the zero-sum criterion, in equilibrium, the sending and
receiving of any message has no effect on the receiver decision.
– In order to use games as part of a general theory of meaning, one has to make
clear how to construct the game-context, which includes providing an inter-
pretation of the game’s ingredients (types, messages, actions). Franke [13]
extended the setting of signaling games to that of interpretation games to
address this issue. Such games encode a ‘canonical context’ for an utterance,
in which relevant conversational implicatures may be drawn. The game struc-
ture is determined by the set of ‘sender types’. Interpretation games model
the interpretation of the messages and actions of a signaling game in a co-
operative context for ‘Gricean agents’ quite well. But in the non-cooperative
setting, things are much more intricate and problems remain (again see [4]).
– Signaling games are one-shot and fail to capture the dynamic nature of a
strategic conversation. One can attempt to encode a sequence of moves of
a particular player as a single message m sent by that player but then one
runs into the problem of assigning correct utilities form because such utilities
depend again on the possible set of continuations of m.
– Finally, there is an inherent asymmetry associated with the setting of a sig-
naling game - one player is informed of the state of the world but the other is
not; one player sends a message but the other does not. Conversations (like
debates), on the other hand, are symmetric - all participants should (and
usually do) get equal opportunities to get their messages across.
Strategic conversations are thus special and have characteristics unique to
them which have not been captured by previous game-theoretic models. Some
of these important characteristics are as follows.
– Conversations are sequential and dynamic and inherently involve a ‘turn-
structure’ which is important in determining the merit of a conversation to
the participants. In other words, it is important to keep track of “who said
what”.
– A ‘move’ by a player in a linguistic game typically carries more semantic
content than usually assumed in game theory. What a player says may have
a set of ‘implicatures’, may be ‘ambiguous’, may be ‘coherent/incoherent’ or
‘consistent/inconsistent’ to what she had said earlier in the conversation. She
may also ‘acknowledge’ other people’s contributions or ‘retract’ her previous
assertions. These features too have important consequences on the existence
and complexity of winning strategies.
– Conversations typically have a ‘Jury’ who evaluates the conversation after it
has ended and determines if one or more of the players have reached their
goals – determines the winner. Players will spin the description of the game to
their advantage and so may not present an accurate view of what happened.
The Jury can be a concrete or even a hypothetical entity who acts as a ‘passive
player’ in the game. For example, in a courtroom situation there is a physical
Jury who gives the verdict, whereas in a political debate the Jury is the
audience or the citizenry in general. This means that the winning conditions
of the players are affected by the Jury in that, they depend on what they
believe that the Jury expects them to achieve.
– Epistemic elements thus naturally creep into such games. In particular, the
players and the Jury have ‘types’. In addition the players also have ‘beliefs’
about the types of the other players and that of the Jury. They strategize
based on their beliefs and also update their beliefs after each turn.
– Lastly but most importantly, conversations do not have a ‘set end’. When
two people or a group of people engage in a conversation they do not know
at the outset how many turns it will last or how many chances each player
will get to speak (if at all). Sure in a ‘conducted’ conversation such as a
political debate or a courtroom debate, there is usually a moderator whose
job is to ensure that each player receives his or her fair chance to put their
points across but even such a moderator does not know at the outset how the
conversation will unfold and how many turns each player will receive. Players
thus cannot strategize for a set horizon while starting a conversation. This
rules out backward induction reasoning for both the players and we analysts.
With the above aspects in mind, [4] model conversations as infinite games
over a countable ‘vocabulary’ V which they call Message Exchange games (ME
games). In this paper, we first summarize the main results of [4] in a compact
fashion but also add some new remarks concerning first order definability of con-
versational goals. We then add a more nuanced analysis of a particular dialogue
excerpt (our example 4) and prove a theorem beyond the scope of [4], showing
how unexpected moves can complicate the search for winning strategies. Finally
in Sect. 3, we break new ground and add an epistemic layer to ME games.
Let’s now turn to the basics of ME games. The intuitive idea behind an ME
game is that a conversation proceeds in turns where in each turn one of the
players ‘speaks’ or plays a string of letters from her own vocabulary. However,
the player does not play just any sequence of arbitrary strings but sentences or
sets of sentences that ‘make sense’. To ensure this, the vocabulary V should have
an exogenous semantics built-in. In order to achieve this, we exploit a semantic
theory for discourse, SDRT [1]. SDRT develops a rich language to character-
ize the semantics and pragmatics of moves in dialogue. This means that we
can exploit the notion of entailment associated with the language of SDRSs to
track commitments of each player in an ME game. In particular, the language
of SDRT features variables for dialogue moves that are characterized by contents
that the move commits its speaker to. Crucially, some of this content involves
predicates that denote rhetorical relations between moves—like the relation of
question answer pair (qap), in which one move answers a prior move character-
ized by a question. The vocabulary V of an ME game thus contains a count-
able set of discourse constituent labels DU = {π, π1, π2, . . .}, and a finite set of
discourse relation symbols R = {R,R1, . . .Rn}, and formulas φ, φ1, . . . from some
fixed language for describing elementary discourse move contents. V consists of
formulas of the form π : φ, where φ is a description of the content of the dis-
course unit labelled by π in a logical language like the language of higher order
logic used, e.g., in Montague Grammar, and R(π, π1), which says that π1 stands
in relation R to π. One such relation R is qap. Thus, each discourse relation
symbolized in V comes with constraints as to when it can be coherently used in
context and when it cannot.
2 Message Exchange Games
In this section we formally define Message Exchange games and state some of
their properties and their use in modeling strategic conversations as explored
at length in [4]. For simplicity, we shall develop the theory for the case of con-
versations that involve two participants, which we shall denote by Player 0 and
Player 1. It will be straightforward to generalize it to the case where there are
more than two players. Thus, in what follows, we shall let i range over the set
of players {0, 1}. Furthermore, Player −i will always denote Player (1− i), the
opponent of Player i.
We first define the notion of a ‘Jury’. As noted in Sect. 1, a Jury is any entity
or a group of entities that evaluates a conversation and decides the winner.
A Jury thus ‘groups’ instances of conversations as being winning for Player 0 or
Player 1 or both.
For any set A let A∗ be the set of all finite sequences over A and let Aω
be the set of all countably infinite sequences over A. Let A∞ = A∗ ∪ Aω and
A+ = A∗ \ {ǫ}. Now, let V be a vocabulary as defined at the end of Sect. 1 and
let Vi = V × {i}. This is to make explicit the ‘turn-structure’ of a conversation
as alluded to in the introduction.
Definition 1. A Jury J over (V0 ∪ V1)
ω is a tuple J = (win1,win2) where
wini ⊆ (V0 ∪ V1)
ω is the winning condition or winning set for Player i.
Given the definition of a Jury over (V0 ∪V1)
ω we define a Message Exchange
game as:
Definition 2. A Message Exchange game (ME game) G over (V0 ∪ V1)
ω is a
tuple G = ((V0 ∪ V1)
ω,J ) where J is a Jury over (V0 ∪ V1)
ω.
Formally the ME game G is played as follows. Player 0 starts the game by
playing a non-empty sequence in V +0 . The turn then moves to Player 1 who plays
a non-empty sequence from V +1 . The turn then goes back to Player 0 and so on.
The game generates a play ρn after n (≥0) turns, where by convention, ρ0 = ǫ
(the empty move). A play can potentially go on forever generating an infinite
play ρω, or more simply ρ. Player i wins the play ρ iff ρ ∈ wini. G is zero-sum if
wini = (V0 ∪ V1)
ω \ win−i and is non zero-sum otherwise. Note that both player
or neither player might win a non zero-sum ME game G. The Jury of a zero-sum
ME game can be denoted simply as win where by convention win = win0 and
win1 = (V0 ∪ V1)
ω \ win.
Plays are segmented into rounds—a move by Player 0 followed by a move by
Player 1. A finite play of an ME game is (also) called a history, and is denoted
by ρ. Let Z be the set of all such histories, Z ⊆ (V0 ∪ V1)
∗, where ǫ ∈ Z is the
empty history and where a history of the form (V0 ∪ V1)
+V +0 is a 0-history and
one of the form (V0 ∪ V1)
+V +1 is a 1-history. We denote the set of i-histories by
Zi. By convention ǫ ∈ Z1. Thus Z = Z0 ∪ Z1. For ρ ∈ Z, turns(ρ) denotes the
total number of turns (by either player) in ρ. A strategy σi of Player i is thus
a function from the set of −i-histories to V +i . That is, σi : Z−i → V
+
i . A play
ρ = x0x1 . . . of an ME game G is said to conform to a strategy σi of Player i if
for every prefix ρj of ρ, j = i( mod 2) implies ρj+1 = ρjσi(ρj). A strategy σi is
called winning for Player i if ρ ∈ wini for every play ρ that conforms to σi.
Given how we have characterized the vocabulary (V0 ∪ V1), we can assumed
a fixed meaning assignment function from EDUs to formulas the describe their
contents. Then, a sequence of conversational moves can be represented as a
graph (DU, E, ℓ), where DU is the set of vertices each representing a discourse
unit, E ⊆ DU × DU a set of edges representing links between discourse units
that are labeled by ℓ : E → R with discourse relations.1
Example 1. To illustrate this structure of conversations, consider the following
example taken from [2] from a courtroom proceedings where a prosecutor is
querying the defendant. We shall return to this example later on for a strategic
analysis.
a. Prosecutor: Do you have any bank accounts in Swiss banks, Mr. Bronston?
b. Bronston: No, sir.
c. Prosecutor: Have you ever?
d. Bronston: The company had an account there for about six months, in Zurich.
e. Prosecutor: Thank you Mr. Bronston.
Example 2. We can view the conversation in Example 1 as an ME game
as in Fig. 1. The figure shows a weakly connected graph, which represents
a fully coherent conversation, with a set of discourse constituent labels
DU = {πbank, π¬bank, πbank−elab, πcompany, πack, . . .} and a set of relations R =
{qap, q− followup, ack, . . .}. The arrows depict the individual relation instances
between the DUs.
ME game messages come with a conventionally associated meaning in virtue
of the constraints enforced by the Jury; an agent who asserts a content of a
message commits to that content, and it is in virtue of such commitments that
other agents respond in kind. While SDRT has a rich language for describing
1 We note that this is a simplification of SDRT which also countenances complex
discourse units (cdus) and another set of edges in the graph representation, linking
cdus to their simpler constituents. These edges represent parthood, not rhetorical
relations. We will not, however, appeal to cdus here.
Fig. 1. An example ME game
dialogue moves, it is not explicit about how dialogue moves explicitly affect the
commitments of the agents who make the moves or those who observe the moves.
[25,26] link the semantics of the SDRT language with commitments explicitly
(in two different ways). They augment the SDRT language with formulas that
describe the commitments of dialogue participants, using a simple propositional
modal syntax. Thus for any formula φ in the language of Montague Grammar
that describes the content of a label π ∈ DU, they add: ¬φ | φ1 ∨ φ2 | Ciφ, i ∈
{0, 1} | C∗φ, with the derived operators ∧, =⇒ ,⊤,⊥ are defined as usual,
providing a propositional logic of commitments over the formulas that describe
labels. Of particular interest are the commitment operators Ci and C
∗. If φ is
a formula for describing a content, Ciφ is a formula that says that Player i
commits to φ and C∗φ denotes ‘common commitment’ of φ. Commitment is
modeled as a Kripke modal operator via an alternativeness relation in a pointed
model with a distinguished (actual) world w0. This allows them to provide a
semantics for discourse moves that links the making of a discourse move by an
agent to her commitments: i’s assertion of a discourse move φ, for instance, we
will assume, entails a common commitment that i commits to φ, written C∗Ciφ.
They show how each discourse move φ defines an action, a change or update on
the model’s commitment structure; in the style of public announcement logic viz.
[6,7]. For instance, if agent i asserts φ, then the commitment structure for the
conversational participants is updated such so as to reflect the fact that C∗Ciφ.
Finally, they define an entailment relation |= that ensures that φ |= C∗Ciφ. This
semantics is useful because it allows us to move from sequences of discourse moves
to sequences of updates on any model for the discourse language. See [25,26] for
a detailed development and discussion.
ME games resemble infinite games that have been used in topology, set theory
[19] and computer science [16] to study the descriptive complexity of different
infinite sets. We can leverage some of the results from these areas to talk about
the general ‘shape’ of conversations or to analyse the complexity of the winning
conditions of the players. This has been extensively explored in [4]. We give a
flavor of some of the applications here.
To do that we first need to define an appropriate topology on (V0 ∪ V1)
ω
which will allow us to characterize the descriptive complexity of the winning
sets win0 and win1. We proceed as follows. We define the topology on (V0 ∪V1)
ω
by defining the open sets to be sets of the form A(V0∪V1)
ω where A ⊆ (V0∪V1)
∗.
Such an open set will be often denoted as O(A). When A is a singleton set {x}
(say), we abuse notation and write O({x}) as O(x). The Borel sets are defined as
the sigma-algebra generated by the open sets of this topology. The Borel sets can
be arranged in a natural hierarchy called the Borel hierarchy which is defined as
follows. Let Σ01 be the set of all open sets. Π
0
1 = Σ
0
1 , the complement of the set
of Σ01 sets, is the set of all closed sets. Then for any α > 1 where α is a successor
ordinal, define Σ0α to be the countable union of all Π
0
α−1 sets and define Π
0
α to
be the complement of Σ0α. ∆
0
α = Σ
0
α ∩Π
0
α.
Definition 3 [19]. A set A is called complete for a class Σ0α (resp. Π
0
α) if A ∈
Σ0α \Π
0
α (resp. Π
0
α \Σ
0
α) and A /∈ (Σ
0
β ∪Π
0
β) for any β < α.
The Borel hierarchy represents the descriptive or structural complexity of the
Borel sets. A set higher up in the hierarchy is structurally more complex than
one that is lower down. Complete sets for a particular class of the hierarchy
represent the structurally most complex sets of that class. We can use the Borel
hierarchy and the notion of completeness to capture the complexity of winning
conditions in conversations. For example, two typical sets in the fist level of the
Borel hierarchy are defined as follows. Let A ⊆ (V0 ∪ V1)
+, then
reach(A) = {ρ ∈ (V0 ∪ V1)
ω | ρ = xyρ′, y ∈ A}, safe(A) = (V0 ∪ V1)
ω \ reach(A)
A little thought convinces us that reach(A) ∈ Σ01 and safe(A) ∈ Π
0
1 . Let reach-
ability be the class of sets of the form reach(A) and safety be the class of sets of
the form safe(A).
Example 3. Returning to our example of Bronston and the Prosecutor, let us
consider what goals the Jury expects each of them to achieve. The Jury will
award its verdict in favor of the Prosecutor: (i) if he can eventually get Bronston
to admit that (a) he had an account in Swiss banks, or (b) he never had an
account in Swiss banks, or (ii) if Bronston avoids answering the Prosecutor
forever. In the case of (i)a, Bronston is incriminated, (i)b, he is charged with
perjury and (ii), he is charged with contempt of court. Bronston’s goal is the
complement of the above, that is to avoid either of the situations (i)a, (i)b
and (ii). We thus see that the Jury winning condition for the Prosecutor is a
Boolean combination of a reachability condition and the complement of a safety
condition, which is in the first level of the Borel hierarchy.
Conversations, to be meaningful, must also satisfy certain natural constraints
which the Jury might impose throughout the course of a play. Below we define
some of these constraints and then go on to study the complexity of the sets
satisfying them.
Let ρ = x0x1x2 . . . be a play of an ME game G where x0 = ǫ and xj ∈
V +((j−1) mod 2) is the sequence played by Player ((j − 1) mod 2) in turn j. For
every i define the function dui : V
+
i → ℘(DU) such that dui(xj) gives the set
of contributions (in terms of DUs) of Player i in the jth turn. By convention,
dui(xj) = ∅ for xj ∈ V
+
−i.
Definition 4. Let G = ((V0 ∪ V1)
ω,J ) be an ME game over (V0 ∪ V1)
ω. Let
ρ = x0x1x2 . . . be a play of G. Then
Consistency: ρ is consistent for Player i if the set {dui(xj)}j>0 is consistent.
Let CONSi denote the set of consistent plays for Player i in G.
Coherence: Player i is coherent on turn j > 0 of play ρ if for all π ∈ dui(xj)
there exists π′ ∈ (dui(xk) ∪ du−i(xk−1)) where k ≤ j such that there exits
R ∈ R such that (π′Rπ∨πRπ′) holds. Let COHi denote the set of all coherent
plays for Player i in G.
Responsiveness: Player i is responsive on turn j > 0 of play ρ if there exists
π ∈ dui(xj) such that there exits π
′ ∈ du−i(xj−1) such that π
′Rπ for some
R ∈ R. Let RESi denote the set of responsive plays for Player i in G. xj (or
abusing notation, π) will be sometimes called a response move.
Rhetorical-cooperativity: Player i is rhetorically-cooperative in ρ if she is both
coherent and responsive in every turn of hers in ρ. ρ is rhetorically-cooperative
if both the players are rhetorically-cooperative in ρ. Let RCi denote the set of
rhetorically-cooperative plays for Player i in G and let RC be the set of all
rhetorically-cooperative plays.
To define the constraints NEC and CNEC we need first the definition of an
‘attack’ and a ‘response’. Thus
Definition 5. Let G = ((V0 ∪ V1)
ω,J ) be an ME game over (V0 ∪ V1)
ω. Let
ρ = x0x1x2 . . . be a play of G. Then
Attack: attack(π′, π) on Player −i holds at turn j of Player i just in case π ∈
dui(xj), π
′ ∈ du−i(xk) for some k ≤ j, there is an R ∈ R such that π
′Rπ and:
(i) π′ entails that −i is committed to φ for some φ, (ii) φ entails that ¬φ holds.
In such a case, we shall often abuse notation and denote it as attack(k, j).
Furthermore, xj or alternatively π shall be called an attack move. An attack
move is relevant if it is also a response move. attack(k, j) on −i is irrefutable
if there is no move xℓ ∈ V−i in any turn ℓ > j such that attack(j, ℓ) holds
and x0x1 . . . xℓ is consistent for −i.
Response: response(π′, π) on Player −i holds at turn j of Player i if there exits
π′′ ∈ dui(xℓ), π
′ ∈ du−i(xk) and π ∈ dui(xj) for some ℓ ≤ k ≤ j, such that
attack(π′′, π′) holds at turn k of Player −i, there exists R ∈ R such that π′Rπ
and π implies that (i) one of i’s commitments φ attacked in π′ is true or (ii)
one of −i’s commitments in π′ that entails that i was committed to ¬φ is
false. We shall often denote this as response(k, j).
We can now define the constraints NEC and CNEC as follows.
Definition 6. Let G = ((V0 ∪ V1)
ω,J ) be an ME game over (V0 ∪ V1)
ω. Let
ρ = x0x1x2 . . . be a play of G. Then
NEC: NEC holds for Player i in ρ on turn j if for all ℓ, k, ℓ ≤ k < j, such that
attack(ℓ, k), there exists m, k < m ≤ j, such that response(k,m). NEC holds
for Player i for the entire play ρ if it holds for her in ρ for infinitely many
turns. Let NECi denote the set of plays of G where NEC holds for player i.
CNEC: CNEC holds for Player i on turn j of ρ if there are fewer attacks on i
with no response in ρj than for −i. CNEC holds for Player i over a ρ if in
the limit there are more prefixes of ρ where CNEC holds for i than there are
prefixes ρ where CNEC holds for −i. Let CNECi be the set of all plays of G
where CNEC holds for i.
For a zero-sum ME game G, the structural complexities of most of the
above constraints can be derived from another constraint which we call rhetorical
decomposition sensitivity (RDS) which is defined as follows.
Definition 7. Given a zero sum ME game G = ((V0 ∪V1)
ω,win), win is rhetor-
ically decomposition sensitive (RDS) if for all ρ ∈ win and for all finite prefixes
ρj of ρ, ρj ∈ Z1 implies there exists x ∈ V
+
0 such that O(ρjx) ∩ win = ∅.
[4] show that if Player 0 has a winning strategy for an RDS winning condition
win then win is a Π02 complete set. Formally,
Proposition 1 [4]. Let G = ((V0 ∪V1)
ω,win) be a zero-sum ME game such that
win is RDS. If Player 0 has a winning strategy in G then win is Π02 complete for
the Borel hierarchy.
In the zero-sum setting, CONS0, RES0, COH0, NEC0 are all RDS and it is
easy to observe that Player 0 has winning strategies in all these constraints
(considered individually). Hence, as an immediate corollary to Proposition 1 we
have
Corollary 1. CONS0, RES0, COH0, NEC0 are Π
0
2 complete for the Borel hier-
archy for a zero sum ME game.
CNEC, on the other hand, is a structurally more complex constraint. This
is not surprising because CNEC can be intuitively viewed as a limiting case of
NEC. Indeed, this was formally shown in [4].
Proposition 2 [4]. CNECi is Π
0
3 complete for the Borel hierarchy for a zero
sum ME game.
The above results have interesting consequences in terms of first-order defin-
ability. Note that certain infinite sequences over our vocabulary (V0∪V1) can be
coded up using first-order logic over discrete linear orders (N, <), where N is the
set of non-negative natural numbers. Indeed, for every i and for every a ∈ Vi, let
ai0 be a predicate such that given a sequence x = x0x1 . . . , xj ∈ (V0 ∪ V1)
for all j ≥ 0, x |= ai0(j) iff xj = a. Closing under finite Boolean opera-
tions and ∀,∃, we obtain the logic FO(<). Now for any formula ϕ ∈ FO(<)
and for any play ρ of an ME game G, ρ |= ϕ can be defined in the standard
way. Thus every formula ϕ ∈ FO(<) gives a set of plays ρ(ϕ) of G defined as:
ρ(ϕ) = {ρ ∈ (V0 ∪ V1)
ω| ρ |= ϕ}. A set A ⊆ (V0 ∪ V1)
ω is said to be FO(<)
definable if there exists a FO(<) formula ϕ such that A = ρ(ϕ). The following
result is well-known.
Theorem 1 [21]. A ⊆ (V0 ∪ V1)
ω is FO(<) definable iff A ∈ (Σ02 ∪Π
0
2 ).
Thus FO(<) cannot define sets that are higher than the second level of the Borel
hierarchy in their structural complexity. Thus as a corollary of Proposition 2 and
Corollary 1, we have
Corollary 2. CONS0, RES0, COH0, NEC0 are FO(<) definable but not CNECi.
This agrees with our intuition because as we observed, CNECi is a limit
constraint and FO(<), being local [14], lacks the power to capture it. To define
CNECi one has to go beyond FO(<) and look at more expressive logics. One
such option is to augment FO(<) with a counting predicate cnt which ranges
over (N ∪ {∞}) [20]. Call this logic FO(<, cnt). One can write formulas of the
type ∃∞xϕ(x) in FO(<, cnt) which says that “there are infinitely many x’s such
that ϕ(x) holds.” Note that it is straightforward to write a formula in FO(<, cnt)
that describes CNECi. Another option is to consider the logic Lω1ω(FO,<)
which is obtained by closing FO(<) under infinitary boolean connectives
∨
j
and
∧
j . We can define a strict syntactic subclass of Lω1ω(FO,<), denoted
L ∗ω1ω(FO,<), where every formula is of the form OpOq . . . Otϕpq...t, where, for
k ∈ {p, q, . . . , t − 1}, Ok =
∨
k iff Ok+1 =
∧
k+1 and each ϕpq...t is an (FO,<)
formula, p, q, . . . , t ∈ N. That is, in every formula of L ∗ω1ω(FO,<), the infinitary
connectives are not nested and occur only in the beginning. We can then show
that L ∗ω1ω(FO,<) can express sets in any countable level of the Borel hierarchy.
We do not go into further details here.
We now turn to strategic analyses of actual conversations. Consider this
example, an excerpt from the 1988 Dan Quayle-Lloyd Bentsen Vice-Presidential
debate which has exercised us now for several years, from the perspective of the
theory of ME games developed above.
Example 4. Quayle (Q), a very junior and politically inexperienced Vice-
Presidential candidate, was repeatedly questioned about his experience and his
qualifications to be President. Till a point in the debate both of them were
going neck to neck. But then to rebut doubts about his qualifications, Quayle
compared his experience with that of the young John (Jack) Kennedy. To that,
Bentsen (BN) made a discourse move that Quayle apparently did not anticipate.
We give the relevant part of the debate below:
a. Quayle: ... the question you’re asking is, “What kind of qualifications does Dan Quayle have
to be president”, [...] I have far more experience than many others that sought the office of vice
president of this country. I have as much experience in the Congress as Jack Kennedy did when
he sought the presidency.
b. Bensten: Senator, I served with Jack Kennedy. I knew Jack Kennedy. Jack Kennedy was a
friend of mine. Senator, you’re no Jack Kennedy.
c. Quayle: That was unfair, sir. Unfair.
d. Bensten: You brought up Kennedy, I didn’t.
Example (4) is an example of how a player can go inconsistent in a debate,
which has disastrous consequences, if the Jury enforces consistency as a necessary
component of any winning condition. But the analysis depends on the semantics
of discourse relations. It would seem that Quayle was unaware that (Example 4b.)
was a possible move for Bentsen in a strategy of countering his commitments
(we shall talk more about unawareness shortly). However, note that Quayle’s
commitments in (Example 4a.) are not innocuous in the first place. He brings up
as a comparison one of the most revered Presidents in contemporary American
history; and while it is true that John F. Kennedy, like Quayle, was a relatively
inexperienced junior senator when he ran for President in 1960, Quayle could
have chosen many other figures for comparison—for instance, Richard Nixon’s
credentials prior to his taking the post of Vice-President in 1952 were also com-
parable to Quayle’s. But by choosing JFK as a reference and by referring to
him with his nickname ’Jack’ used by his advisors and friends, Quayle made the
suggestion or weak-implicature, that perhaps he would be comparable in other
ways to JFK. It certainly put Quayle’s experience or lack thereof in a favorable
light.
Notice too that Quayle did not come out with a bald assertion of this impli-
cature in (Example 4a.). He did not say
a’. I have as much experience in the Congress and as much Presidential potential as Jack Kennedy
did when he sought the presidency.
He sensed this would be a dangerous move, opening him up to attack and perhaps
even ridicule, either from his opponent or at least in the minds of the Jury. So
instead, he couched his message in an implicit form.
Our intuition is that Quayle did not anticipate a direct attack on the implica-
ture he was drawing out. Perhaps he was not even aware that he was making such
an implicature, though our discussion of alternatives suggests that something like
that implicature is there and the result of a choice of Quayle’s comparison. In
any case, Quayle had no real counter-move or strategy prepared, we feel.
So what happened with Quayle’s response? (Example 4d.) in discourse the-
ory terms is a ‘commentary’ on Bentsen’s attack move. Commentaries carry with
them a commitment by their speaker to the content they are commenting on.
Now if the commentary’s target is the content of what Bentsen said, then this
is devastating for Quayle. By saying Quayle is no Kennedy, Bentsen is impli-
cating something stronger, that Quayle is not of Presidential material. With
commentary on the content, Quayle then commits to that content. In so doing
he commits to his not being of Presidential stature when precisely his winning
condition was to constantly come back to that commitment and reaffirm it. His
commitments are now inconsistent, and inconsistency can be a game-losing prop-
erty in a conversation. Moreover, this was an inconsistency involving an intrinsic
property of Quayle’s winning condition.
There is an alternative interpretation of the commentary move (Example 4d.)
by Quayle. The commentary move is not about the content of Bensten’s move but
rather about the fact that Bensten made this move. This seems more plausible
and it commits Quayle on the face of it only to the fact that Bentsen made a
particular discourse move. But by not counter-attacking Bensten, Quayle sends a
message that is terrible for him. First, he commits that the attack is coherent and
responsive. Second, by not replying he concedes and commits to the proposition
that the content of Bensten’s move and its implicatures are not attackable. That
is, Quayle implicates he has no means to refute the content of the attack. But
this in turn implies that he implicitly must commit to their content. Hence, his
non-reply makes his commitments look inconsistent.
Example 4 also lends itself to an analysis from the perspective of ‘unaware-
ness’ of moves available to one player by the other player. What happens when
Player 0 thinks that an ME game G is being played over a vocabulary (V0 ∪ V1)
whereas Player 1 actually has moves available to him from a larger vocabulary
W1  V1? That is G = ((V0 ∪W1)
ω,J ). To answer this question, we make use
of the following result.
Proposition 3. Let V and W be countable vocabularies such that V  W .
Then, a Σ10 complete set in X
ω jumps to ∆02 in Y
ω, and all other sets stay in
the same level.
To preserve the continuity of the text, we give the proof in the appendix.
Proposition 3 thus implies that a winning set win which is Σ01 in an ME game
G = ((V0 ∪ V1)
ω,J ) might be ∆02 in an ME game G
′ = ((V0 ∪W1)
ω,J ) where
W1  V1. win is hence more complex structurally in G
′. The result of this might
be that even if Player 0 had a winning strategy σ0 in G, σ0 might not be winning
for her in G′.
Coming back now to Example 4, Quayle believed that if he just made his
comparison with John F. Kennedy, to whom he refers by his colloquial nickname
used by friends and members of JFK’s cabinet, no matter what the response
Bentsen made, that is the responses of which he was aware in V1 would hurt
his chances. He had a simple goal, which we could characterize as a Σ01 goal:
mentioning this comparison. As such, he also had a simple winning strategy for
achieving this goal. However, in the larger set of discourse moves, W1 Bentsen
had an attack that floored Quayle. In fact, we can easily show that Quayle had no
winning strategy for keeping to his winning condition over strings in (V0 ∪V1)
ω;
given that his winning strategy depended on his opponent’s use of moves in V1,
all that Bentsen had to do to defeat Quayle was to use a coherent move in W1
to upset Quayle’s strategy. This is a simple-minded yet insightful analysis of the
interesting and deep notion of unawareness which we wish to fully explore in
our future work. To fully understand this phenomenon, one has to appeal to the
theory of epistemic games, to which we now turn.
3 Imperfect Information and Epistemic Considerations
So far we have shown how to model strategic conversations as infinite sequential
games and how to reason about the complexity of certain commonly used win-
ning goals in such conversations in terms of both their topological and logical
complexities. A couple of issues that we have not addressed are:
– Yes, a conversation at the outset can be potentially infinite. But still in real
life, the Jury does end the game after a finite amount of time, after a finite
number of turns. By doing so, how can it be sure that it has correctly deter-
mined the outcome of the conversation? In other words, how does the Jury,
at any point in a conversation gauge how the players are faring and when
does it decide to call it a day?
– How does the Jury determine the winning conditions win0 and win1? Surely,
it does not come up with a arbitrary subset of (V0 ∪ V1)
ω with an arbitrary
Borel complexity.
To address the above questions [3] introduced the model of ‘weighted ME games’
or WME games. A WME game is similar to a ME game except that the Jury
instead of specifying the winning sets wini as subsets of (V0 ∪ V1)
ω, determines
them on-the-fly. It does so by evaluating every move of each player by assigning
a ‘weight’ or a ‘score’. The cumulative weight of a conversation ρ is then the
discounted sum of these individual weights. [3] also showed that given an ǫ > 0
there exists a number nǫ such that the Jury can stop the game after nǫ turns
and determine the winner, being sure that no player could have done more than
ǫ better than what they had already done. We do not go into the details here
but refer the interested reader to that paper.
In this section, we study the exact information structure implicit in the
strategic reasoning in conversations by extending framework of ME games
with epistemic notions. We use the well-established theory of type-structures,
first introduced in [17] and widely studied since. We assume that each player
i ∈ ({0, 1} ∪ {J }) has a (possibly infinite) set of types Ti. With each type
ti of Player i is associated a (first-order) belief function βi(ti) which assigns
to ti a probability distribution over the types of the other players. That is,
βi : Ti → ∆(
∏
j =i Tj). βi(ti) represents the ‘beliefs’ of type ti of Player i about
the types of the other players and the Jury. The higher-order beliefs can be
defined in a standard way by iterating the functions βi. We assume that each
type ti of each Player i starts the game with an initial belief βi(ti) ∈ ∆(
∏
j =i Tj),
called the ‘prior belief’. The players take turns in making their moves and after
every move, all the players dynamically update their beliefs through Bayesian
updates. The notions of ‘optimal strategies’, ‘best-response’, ‘rationality’, ‘com-
mon belief in rationality’ etc. can then be defined in the standard way (see [12]).
Having imposed the above epistemic structure on ME games, we can now rea-
son about the ‘rationality’ of the players’ strategies. In order to justify or predict
the outcome of games, many different solution concepts viz., Nash equilibrium,
iterated removal of dominated strategies, correlated equilibrium, rationalizabil-
ity etc. have been proposed [5,10,22]. Most of them have also been characterized
in terms of the exact belief structure and strategic behavior of the players (see
[12] for an overview). We can borrow results from this rich literature to predict
or justify outcomes in strategic conversations. The details of the above is on-
going work and we leave it to an ensuing paper. However, let us apply the above
concepts and analyze our original example of Bronston and the Prosecutor.
To illustrate the power of types, let us return to Example 1. One conversa-
tional goal of the Prosecutor in Example 1 is to get Bronston to commit to an
answer eventually (and admit to an incriminating fact) or to continue to refuse
to answer (in which case he will be charged with contempt of court). Under such
a situation, the response (1d.) of Bronston is clearly a clever strategic move.
Bronston’s response (1d.) was a strategic move aimed to ‘misdirect’ the Jury J .
He believed that J was of a type that would be convinced by his ambiguous
response and neither incriminate him nor charge him with perjury nor of con-
tempt of court. His move was indeed rational, given his belief about the Jury
type. It turns out that while the jury of a lower court J1 was not convinced
of Bronston’s arguments and charged him with perjury, a higher court J2 over-
turned the verdict and released him. Thus his belief agreed with J2 but not J1.
Powerful as the above techniques are, one has to exercise caution and define
the moves, states and the types of the players carefully. Having too rich a
type space can lead to inexistence results. For example, consider the following
situation.
Example 5. Two philosophers Michael and Brian must occupy a panel discussion
before an audience. They both have an extremely good opinion of themselves.
Each philosopher’s goal is to prove that he is better than the other by talking
highly of himself. They exchange dialogues where in every turn a philosopher can
boast of himself as long as he wants to but eventually has to stop and concede
the turn to the other philosopher. The audience, unlike the philosophers, can
become impatient and decide at any moment to stop the discussion, give its
verdict and leave. It offers the win to the one who has spoken ‘more’ of himself.
Clearly, the above game does not have an equilibrium pair of strategies. To
see this, suppose without loss of generality that Michael speaks first. He has to
concede the turn to Brian after saying m1 points in his own favour (say). Brian
plays next and he says b1 points in his own favour. Now suppose the audience
decides to stop the conversation after k sentences have been uttered by both
the players. We can always find a k such that neither Michael nor Brian has a
winning strategy. Indeed, if b1 > m1 and k = b1 +m1 then Michael cannot win.
However, if k < 2p1 Brian cannot win. Thus, both Michael and Brian could have
done better by having said a ‘bit more’ about themselves in their corresponding
turns. Without equilibria, it is unclear what our speakers should do in such a
situation. Such examples pose a challenge to a fundamental assumption amongst
linguists and philosophers that conversation is a rational activity with optimal
strategies for achieving speakers’ goals.
Our example in fact follows from a general result by [18], which says that if the
space of types is not a separable set then there always exists a game with no equi-
librium. In the above game, associating the types of a player with possible subsets
of her strategies, we see that the space of types is a set with a large cardinality
(> ℵ1) and hence we lose separability.
Conversationalists are aware implicitly of the dangers of such cases and
debates have exogenous means of ensuring that there are optimal strategies for
the speakers to follow. For instance, in debates there is usually a ‘moderator’
who ensures that all the participants get a fair chance to speak. She might inter-
rupt a speaker and pass the turn on to another speaker. Note that this variant
of our example game (Example 5) restores the presence of an equilibrium: each
philosopher keeps speaking about himself till he is interrupted by the moderator
- that is the best he can do anyway since he does not know in advance when he
will be interrupted. More generally, we can restore separability (and hence the
existence of equilibria) by limiting the set of types. One way is to require that
each type (and hence each winning condition that players might countenance) be
expressible in some language with a limited complexity. As long as the language
is countable, separability can be restored for type spaces, and then by [18] any
such game must have an equilibrium. Another way is to simply restrict the space
of types to a strict subset of the entire space [8,9]. Thus not all possible subsets
of the conversational space define rational or rationalizable conversational goals.
In the case of our example (Example 5) this means that our philosophers should
limit the set of types that they consider possible. For example, they might expect
each turn to last for a maximum of 20min (say) so that their belief closed set is
restricted to types of players who speak for a maximum of 20min in each turn.
This ensures the presence of an equilibrium.
4 Conclusion
We believe that the work summarized and extended in this paper is the start
of a novel yet powerful approach to study strategic conversations. We have but
scratched the surface here and there are many directions into which we would
like to delve deeper in the future. One such direction, as we already mentioned, is
to work out the epistemic theory of ME games in full detail. That is our current
work in progress. Another is that in the present work we have considered the
Jury as a ‘passive’ entity - it simply evaluates the play and determines the
winner. However, in real life situations, the Jury can be an ‘active’ member of
the conversation itself. It can ‘applaud’ or ‘criticize’ moves of the players. Thus,
the Jury can be seen as making these moves in the game. Based on what the
players observe about the Jury, they may update or change their beliefs and
vice-versa. Incorporating this into our ME games requires a modification of the
current framework where the Jury is another player making moves from its own
set of vocabulary. We plan to explore this in future work.
Finally, in addition to the Jury, debates usually also have a moderator whose
job is to conduct the debate and assign turns to the players. The moderator may
also actively ‘pass comments’ about the moves of the players. A fair moderator
gives all the players equal opportunity to speak and put their points across.
However, if the moderator is unfair, he may ‘starve’ a particular player by not
letting her enough chance to speak, respond to attacks and so on. Exploring the
effects the inclusion of a moderator in such conversations is another interesting
topic which we leave for future work.
A Appendix
To prove Proposition 3 we shall refer to a result from [23].
Proposition 4 [23]. If V is an infinite vocabulary, the subsets of V ω of the form
AV ω, where A is a set of words of bounded length of V ∗ are clopen.
We now prove Proposition 3.
Proof. First, we show that the set V ω is closed but not open in the space Wω.
That is, V ω ∈ (Π01 \Σ
0
1) in W
ω. Indeed, we have
V ω =
⋂
n≥0
V nWω
For every n ≥ 0 we have that V n is a set of words of bounded length of V ∗ and
hence by Proposition 4 we have that V nWω is clopen. Thus V ω is closed. Also,
V ω is not open by the definition of open sets.
Now let X ⊂ V ω be (Σ01 \Π
0
1 ) in V
ω. By definition, we know that X is of
the form AV ω where A ⊂ V ∗ Thus
X = AV ω = AWω ∩ V ω
Then since AWω is open (Σ01) in W
ω and V ω, as we just showed, is closed
(Π01 \Σ
0
1) in W
ω, their intersection is a ∆02 set.
Next let Y ⊂ Xω be (Π01 \ Σ
0
1) in V
ω. We show that Y is also closed in
Wω. Indeed, because the complement of Y in V ω is of the form BV ω for some
B ⊂ V ∗. Hence, the complement of Y in Wω is
Wω \ Y = BWω ∪W ∗(W \ V )Wω
which is open.
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